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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRANK FUOCO and ANNA
FUOCO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
BENJAMIN H. \VILLIAMS and
VERNA V. WILLIAMS,
Defendants-Respondents.

No.
10362

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is the second appeal from judgments of the
District Court of Salt Lake County in this case which
involves a boundary line by acquiescence.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case in the second trial was tried to the court.
From a judgment for the defendant, plaintiffs appeal.
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The plaintiffs brought this suit against the defendants to quiet title to a tract of land located in Salt
Lake County, specifically described in the complaint,
to enjoin the defendants from trespassing and for
damages. The defendants answered and counterclaimed
alleging ownership and right of possession of a specifically described tract of land and praying for injunctive relief and damages. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a summary judgment based on an affidavit
and map which indicated that an overlap of approximately 20 feet was created by a tie to a "county monument in the intersection of two county roads" which
first appears in the defendants' chain of title in a deed
to the defendants dated October 31, 1950. (R. 7-9).
After hearing, the trial court granted the motion
for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs had
record title to the 20 feet. However, the court permitted
the filing of an amended answer and counterclaim to
plead title by adverse possession and acquiescence. (R.
IO). Such amended pleading was filed. (R. 14-17).
At the pre-trial conference the court ruled that before
the defendants could present evidence upon the issue
of adverse possession "they must supply the plaintiffs
with a copy of the tax description showing description
of the property under which they claim to have paid
taxes . . . at least ten days prior to the trial." (R.
19-21). This was not done. The only remaining issue
was title by acquiescence.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment and
judgment in their favor quieting title to the real estate
in dispute as a matter of law, or that failing, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The twenty-foot strip o f land in dispute is
shown on Exhibit P-1 by the letters "ABCD", "AB"
being the boundary line claimed by the defendants and
"CD" being the line claimed by the plaintiffs. (R. 20).
See also the area marked on Exhibit P-1. The property
in question is located near the intersection of Highland
Drive and 3900 South. Defendants built a fence along
line "CD" a short time before the suit was filed. (R.
66, 67) . This precipitated the suit.
The testimony of the defendant, B. H. Williams,
is set out rather fully because the appellants claim
that no title by acquiescence was proved, and that if
there is proof anywhere in the record it is by the following testimony.
Mr. Williams, when asked "if there was any line
of any kind dividing the Butterworth property" from
that of his father stated, "There was no fence in there,
just east of the ditch." (R. 47). Mr. Williams then
stated that the ditch was placed there in about 1916
or 1917 and the questioning went on to show the present
location of the ditch. (R. 47). No statement was ever
made that the ditch is the actual boundary.
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Mr. Williams went on to testify that the ditch was
used to irrigate the Butterworth property. (R. 50),
[Butterworth land is the same as that now owned by
Mr. Fuoco, R. 54], and that no person ever used the
ditch to take care of land east of the ditch. ( R. 51).
It was also stated by l\'lr. Williams that the ditch "was
deep enough to be clearly seen at any and all times"
since 1920. (R. 53). And, that neither Mr. Butterworth, nor any other owner of this property, made any
claims to any land east of the ditch. ( R. 54) .
On cross-examination, the ditch was described as
follows:
"Q. How deep and wide was that ditch as it ran
south from the point where it crosed the lane?

A. It was two good plow furrows, 12-inch plow
furroughs.

Q. In other words, what would a plow furrow

be?

A. 12 inches.

Q. 12 inches by 6 or 8 inches deep?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you think the ditch would be maybe 2
feet wide, 6 or 8 inches deep?
A. Yes, sir." (R. 65}.

Also:
"Q. Now, Mr. Young - or Mr. Williams, I
think you have testified that that ditch has never
been changed in location since it was built along
about 1915 or 1916?
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A. A foot or two east or west.

Q. Has it been moved east or west 1
A. That is what I say, it could have been moved
east or west.
Q. It could have been moved a foot or two east
or west?
A. It is in the same location as it is located in
now.
Q. I will ask you if it is in the same location now
as it was in 1950?

A. Yes, that is right. That is where the ditch is,
just west of my f enceline." (R. 65, 66).
With respect to the ditch, plaintiff, Mr. Fuoco,
testified that he didn't see a ditch when he walked over
the ground before purchasing (R. 91), nor later (R.
99). Plaintiff's witnesses, Janet Sander and Frank
Young described the ditch as "not much of a ditch,"
(R. 144) and "a little ditch that runs south, but it
wasn't up to much." (R. 150). Plaintiffs' witness, Grace
Young, describing the ditch, stated, "I would say like
I said, that somebody just took a shovel and shoveled
it off."
With respect to the entire Fuoco tract of land,
it was clearly shown in the trial that for a number of
years this area had grown up in weeds. (R. 81, 120,
121, 142, 155). Williams said it had been in weeds
except for one year, since 1939. (R. 81). Mr. Oman
stipulated that "it has grown in weeds for the last
fifteen years or so." (R. 142).
7

Mr. Williams testified that he leased and farmed
what is now the Fuoco property in 1923 or 1924 and
then his father leased it from about 1925 to 1934. (R.
79, 80). Williams again used the Fuoco land from 1934
to 1937 and Leone Le Chaminant farmed it from 1937
to 1939. From 1939 to 1959 the irrigation ditch was
not used except for one year. (R. 81, 82).
The Williams land east of the ditch was used for
a manure pile and stack yard until about 1938 when
the barn was moved. ( R. 71-73) . There is no evidence
of use until 1950 when Williams planted a garden.
(R. 83).
The only other testimony of Mr. Williams which
bears on the question of acquiescence is as follows:
"Q. Mr. Williams, as to any work you did, or
your father did, raising crops over on Butterworth's land, did you divide the crop between
yourself and Butterworth?

A. Yes. We took two thirds and gave Butterworth one-third.
Q. And I asked you what line you used to divide
the Butterworth crop from your crop.

MR. SKEEN: I object as calling for a conclusion of the witness.
MR. OMAN: He did the work.
MR. SKEEN: It is a conclusion to say what
line was adopted and further it is leading.
THE COURT: Use the word 'ditch' then.
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l\IR. 0 MAN: I beg your pardon, your Honor.
I didn't hear you.
THE COURT: Restate the question.

Q. (By Mr. Oman) l\fr. Williams, did you divide with Butterworth all crops raised on the
west side of this d)_tch we have been talking
about?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you give him any part of the crop raised
on the east side of that ditch?

A. No, sir.
Q. You claimed that property as your own?

A. Yes, sir." (R. 83, 84).
The trial court found in favor of the defendants
as to the location of the ditch and acquiescence in the
ditch as a. boundary line. ( R. 26-28) .
This appeal is taken from the judgment of the
trial court.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. The defendants failed to prove the long, con-

tinued existence of a monument definitely establishing
a boundary line.
2. There is no evidence that the parties mutually

recognized the ditch as the boundary line.
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.
ARGUMENT
THE DEFENDANTS FAILED TO
PROVE THE LONG, CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF A MONUMENT DEFINITELY ESTABLISHING A BOUNDARY LINE.
I.

As indicated in the trial, all of the issues in this
case have been resolved, except the issue of title by
acquiescence. ( R. 45) . The record title to the twentyfoot strip of land in dispute is in the appellants.
This Court has held that in order to make a case
under the acquiescence doctrine, it must be shown:
( 1) There was uncertainty as to the location of
the true boundary.
( 2) The parties have occupied their respective
parcels up to an open boundary line, visibly marked
by monuments, fences or buildings.
(3) The monument, fence or building must have
existed for a long period of time.
( 4) The monument, fence or building must have
been mutually recognized as the dividing line.
Fuoco vs. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d
143; King vs. Fronk, 14 Utah 135, 378 P.2d 893;
Brown vs. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202; Glenn
vs. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257; Ringwood
vs. Bradford, 2 Utah 2d 119, 269 P.2d 1053; Hummel
vs. Young, 1 Utah 2d 237, 265 P.2d 410.
10

In the case of King vs. Fronk, supra, the court
referred to the boundary marked on the ground as
"monuments visibly placed," "monumented line," and
an "existing line marked by monuments." The only
basis for acquiescence in this case was considering the
irrigation ditch to be a "monument" within the meaning of the rule.
A monument is defined by the dictionary as "permanent landmarks established for the purpose of indicating boundaries." Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third
Edition.
Obvioulsy an irrigation ditch is not ordinarily constructed for the purpose of marking a boundary. It
is used for carrying water to the place of use and must
be constructed to conform to the slope and contour of
the land and to connect with the water source and with
other ditches and laterals. An irrigation ditch, particularly a small ditch, would not give notice to one who
views it that it would establish a boundary line as in
the case of a fence or building. If we assume for the
sake of argument that the land in each tract was occupied up to a small ditch, such as the one involved here,
this fact alone would not put the parties upon notice
of intent to claim ownership of the ditch. A landowner
"could not irrigate uphill from a ditch" and the fact
that his neighbor used the land to the ditch could easily
be explained as a neighborly act or a grant of license.
From the evidence it is clear that there was not
a monument of the kind contemplated by the rule and
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there is no evidence that there was anything on the
ground of long and continued existence definitely
establishing a boundary line. It was stipulated that the
Fuoco property, including the twenty-foot strip, was
in weeds for at least 15 years immediately prior to the
filing of this suit. (R. 142). As indicated above, Williams testified that the ditch was only used in one year
from 1939 to 1959. (R. 81, 82).
Because the whole tract of land was in weeds for
such a long period of time, it is evident that the parties
were not occupying up to an open boundary line, visibly
marked, as is required for acquiescence in this jurisdiction. King vs. Fronk, supra. See page 7 of this
brief.
The ditch, it was testified to by Mr. Williams, has
been moved "a foot or two east or west," or "Could
have been moved a foot or two east or west." (R. 65,
66). A boundary which has been moved or could have
been moved, even a foot or two, does not ftP within
the definition of a "monument,"-see page ~ of this
brief ,-as it is not a permanent landmark. A boundary
to land cannot be such that it can be moved around
at will, this is another reason why the ditch in this case
should not be considered a long, existing monument
establishing a boundary.
The location of the ditch was also disputed. Mr.
Williams tied the location of the line to two landmarks.
One was "just east of the ditch." (R. 47). The present
fence was built "right on the edge" of the ditch, (R.
12

53) and the present fence, he stated, is "about in the
same line" as some old fence posts which have since
rotted out. (R. 62). The present fence was constructed
shortly before the trial (R. 66, 67) so this attempted
tie is of little help. Mr. Williams then said the fence
along the east side of Frank Young's property, the
property north of the lane, has been within a foot or
two of its present location for 60 years. (R. 63, 118).
The Young fence is shown on Exhibit P-1 by some
red crosses. (R. 118). Mr. Williams did not tie thf
present fence or the old fence posts with anything but
the present ditch, or with the west side of his father's
property. (R. 62).
The second reference point used was an old flume
which crossed the lane and carried water to the ditch
in question. This, it was stated by the witnesses testifying to it, crossed the lane at the south end of the Young
fence. (R. 64, 119, 150, 168). Mr. Williams said the
ditch crossed the lane and ran 18 or 20 feet west before
going directly south. (R. 65). Plaintiffs' disinterested
witnesses testified that the ditch ran directly south from
the flume as follows:
Mr. Sanders: The old fence posts were in line with
the Young fence and the ditch ran "directly south" of
where it crossed the lane. "There was no jog in there."
(R. 134).
Mr. Young: The ditch ran south, "just on a degree to the southwest." But, there were no jogs. "It
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run straight, come across the road and run straight
down in front of the barn." (R. 150, 151).
Mrs. Sander: The ditch went south from the flume.
(R. 143-144).

On cross-examination, Mr. Williams was asked
to locate the old fence posts on the map. In so doing,
he placed some pen circles on the red line, "CD", on
Exhibit P-1. (R. 62). That line is the line plaintiffs
are claiming and the circles were also placed on a line
with the fence on the east side of Frank Young's property. It should be noted that the flume was also on this
line. (See Exhibit P-1).
We submit that the evidence fails to show a monument of any kind which was intended to establish a
boundary and that the evidence is in dispute as to the
location of the small ditch which it is claimed by the
defendants marks the boundary. Williams' evidence as
to location is contradictory and vague. He testified
that the ditch was located near old fence posts which
he indicated on the map Exhibit P-1 exactly on the
boundary line claimed by the plaintiffs; (R. 118), and
then on redirect testified in response to a leading question that he intended to put the marks where the
present fence is located. (R. 30-31). He admitted the
ditch had been moved and all the distinterested witnesses whose testimony is quoted above testified that
the old ditch, prior to 1954, had been about 20 feet
east of the present ditch. It is apparent from the foregoing that if a small, two-plow furrow ditch can be
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used as a "definite" monument within the rule of this
court established in this case on the previous appeal,
and in King vs. Fronk, supra, confusion and chaos
in land cases will be the result.
2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF MUTUAL

RECOGNITION OF THE DITCH AS A
BOUNDARY LINE OVER A LONG PERIOD
OF TIME.
The record discloses the following with respect to
ownership of the land on each side of the ditch as follows:

Williams Property
Prior to 1935

Henry Benjamin Williams

1935 to 1950

Mercy Hodgson Williams

1950 to present

Defendants (R. 9)

Fuoco Property
1896 to 1936

Melinda H. Butterworth

1936 to 1951

Annie N. M. Christensen and
Effie G. Butterworth

1951 to 1959

H. Leland Christensen

1959 to present

Plaintiffs (R. 8, 9) .

During the tweny-year period prior to the commencement of suit, from 1942 to 1962, there is no evidence of recognition of the ditch as a boundary line by
15

Fuoco and his predecessors in interest. There is no
evidence by written or oral agreement or by acts or
conduct. In fact, the testimony of the defendant, Benjamin Williams, is that for a period of 20 years from
1939 to 1959 the Fuoco property was cultivated only
one year (Williams did not know what year) and the
rest of the time it grew up in weeds. (R. 81, 82). It
was held in the case of Fuoco vs. Williams, supra, that
use of the land up to a ditch on each side of the ditch is
not such acts or conduct as would show mutual recognition of the ditch as a boundary line. The Court said:
" ... In the case at bar it was conceded that
defendants had occupied the land up to the ditch
for a long period of years and that the dispute
was between adjoining land owners. The evidence presented shows the ditch was used for
irrigation purposes and the record is void of
any evidence showing that the plaintiffs' predecessors ever acquiesced in it as a boundary line;
therefore, the first issue must be resolved in favor
of the plaintiffs.
As to the second issue, we believe that the
court erred in telling the jury that the only
question was the location of the small irrigation
ditch, since such presentation to the jury was
based on the assumption that the irrigation ditch
was dug where it was for the purpose of establishing a boundarJJ and not for the purpose of
irrigating land. Any number of ditches could
criss-cross one's property for the purpose of irrigating land without any contention or realistic
assumption that they were to be boundary lines,
-even though by permission, others may have
used the dry land in between. . . . "
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The Court reversed and remanded with the following instructions :
"Therefore, the judgment of the trial court
is reversed and remanded for a new trial with
instructions to the effect that the judge or jury
should determine the matters of whether the
ditch was acquiesced in over a long period of
time, as a boundary and not simply as an irrigation medium. . . . "
In the second trial, as indicated above, there is
not only a failure on the part of the defendants to show
acquiescence in the ditch as a boundary over a long
period of time, but the proof is that there was no occupancy up to the ditch. The land grew up in weeds
(except for one year) from 1939 to 1959. This testimony of Williams certainly negatives occupation up
to the ditch and makes this case weaker than the one
which was reversed.
During the period from 1923 to 1924 the evidence
is that Benjamin Williams leased what is now the
Fuoco property and farmed the land on both sides of
the ditch on a crop share basis. Williams testified that
during that period of time the crop returns on the land
west of the ditch were divided on the basis of one-third
and two-thirds with Butterworth. Butterworth is referred to as "him" (R. 83) and neither his relationship
to the record owner, Melinda Butterworth, nor his
identity is disclosed in the record. There is no evidence
that Williams' father, who succeeded Williams as lessee
from 1924 to 1934, divided the crop proceeds on the
17

basis of the ditch. ( R. 80) . Thus, for a period of 29
years out of the 38 years immediately prior to filing
the suit (for 19 years it was in weeds and for 10 years
it was leased by Williams (R. 80) )-the defendants
could not have been occupying the land adversely to
plaintiffs or their predecessors. If the division of crop
receipts constituted acquiescence it was only for one
year and did not meet the requirement of "acquiescence
over a long period of time."
Under a familiar rule of law, a lessee cannot take
advantage of the landlord and tenant relationship to
defeat the title of the landlord. The rule in this jurisdiction is stated in Woodbury vs. Bunker, 98 Utah
216, 98 P.2d 948, as follows:
" ... So long as the tenant remains in possession, his possession is that of the landlord, and
he cannot by words or acts make his possession
of that of one whom he permits upon the premises a possession adverse to the landlord. . . . "
The defendants having failed to prove the necessary elements of a title by acquiescence, the record
boundary line "CD", Exhibit P-1, must stand as the
true boundary.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment
must be reversed. The District Court should be directed to enter a judgment for the appellants.

E.J. SKEEN
522 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiffs and
Appellants
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